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Science and Legal Education
Arthur Selwyn Miller
Law, by nature, is a conservative influence in American society. Lawyers, arguesProfessorMiller, have become mere technicians. To meet the
challenges of science and technology, the author believes that lawyers
and law schools must reevaluate and adapt themselves to a policy oriented
approach to the law utilizingpast precedent but also becoming cognizant
of rapid social (and legal) change. In this way, lawyers can aid in the
management of change so as to preserve humanistic values.

N HIS REMARKS, Dr. Wald set out a number of provocative
0 challenges presented to mankind and to the American people
by an onrushing science and its handmaiden, technology. I should
like to comment on his remarks, speaking from the viewpoint of a
legal educator asking the quesTHE AUTHoR: ARTHUR SELWYN M Ldon: What is the response of
LER (A.B., Willamette University; LLB.,
Stanford University; J.S.D., Yale University) is Professor of Law at The National
Law Center of George Washington Uni-

versity.

the law to the exponential

growth in scientific knowledge
during the modern era?

Let us begin with a sim-

ple proposition: science mdans
change. Law and legal education, while they must adapt to these
changes, give no built-in guarantee that their reactions will be beneficial. Thus, the question is not whether the law will respond to
these challenges. That, it seems to me, is inevitable and unavoidable. A response will be made, in some manner, if for no other
reason than that law is the means by which people formally order
their affairs. Law is always present in human society in one form
or another. Rather, the question is how will law react. By that I
do not mean something anthropomorphic; law, as I see it, has no
existence apart from human beings in their collective activities as
groups or nations or societies. In other words, how will lawyers
react? What sort of legal system will evolve? What ends or purposes will be sought? What values will be preserved?
I wish I could be sanguine on those questions, but I cannot.
One would have to be what the late Judge Jerome Frank called a
"glandular optimist" to believe that the legal profession has the inherent capacity and the will to develop the responses necessary for
the preservation of the essential values of a constitutional order, of
a society which places a high regard for the individual human being,
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and of values that are imbedded in the Judaeo-Christian tradition.'
Ample evidence already exists of what Dr. Wald has called "practicing a technology upon man."
Not that the scene is entirely somber. Some signs of awakening
may be perceived in the sleeping giant of law. For Western Reserve University to celebrate the 75th anniversary of its law school
with the theme "Science and Law" is itself a heartening token.
Others may be seen in some of the nation's law schools. Individual
professors at a number of schools are pursuing law-science research.
Some institutes and programs have been established. The work at
the University of Pittsburgh in information storage and retrieval is
but one instance. At my own George Washington University, we
have recently established a law, science, and technology program,
which itself is a component part of a universitywide program in
policy studies in science and technology. Here at Western Reserve
may be found a leading center for the study of law and medicine.
Even with these frontier developments, the norm in legal education is quite the contrary; our law schools, one may say with confidence, are at least 40 years behind time and falling more so each
year. Legal educators are tending to become narrow technicians mechanics or plumbers rather than architects or engineers. For example, a noteworthy change for a law school is to argue endlessly
over whether torts or contracts should be taught in 4 hours or 5
hours. There is a law, I believe, of faculty meetings: the less important the topic, the longer it will be discussed. I submit this
to you as a scientific statement of the manner in which highly paid
academic lawyers spend some of their time. When we are not in

faculty meetings, we professors often are in committee meetings, of
which the less said the better.
We transmit "technicism," as compared with true professionalism, in our teaching by engaging in those 50-minute ceremonies
designed, as the old saw goes, to sharpen the student's mind by narrowing it. This is accomplished through the perusal of appellate
court opinions - what some middle-aged or elderly men said went
on in, and how they resolved, a human dispute that ended in litigation. The label for this is the "case method," based on a belief by
a man termed a "brilliant neurotic," Christopher Columbus Langdell of the Harvard Law School, that the scientific study of law is
1 Compare Morison, Where Is Biology Taking Us?, 155 Sci. 429 (1967), with
White, The HistoricalRoots of Our Ecologic Crisis, 155 Sci. 1203 (1967).
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best pursued in the medium of reported court decisions - in the
library.
The bar helps to perpetuate the system, of course, by establishing an examining procedure which favors those who have engaged
in classroom casuistry for six semesters. What relation there is between a bar examination and the successful practice of law has never
been demonstrated. It is probably possible to take any middling
intelligent person off the street, give him six months or a year of
concentrated cramming, and get him past most such examinations.
It is odd indeed that a first effort of bringing law and -technology
together is in computerized research techniques, a system which will
guarantee perpetuation of the errors of the past. Such efforts are
based on at least two faulty assumptions: (a) that everything that
every appellate court has said is worth saving, and (b) that the task
of the lawyer in the modern era is mainly that of looking retrospectively. Be that as it may, the glory of the law schools is the "case
method" of study, by which is meant cases as reported by appellate
courts. This is supposed to teach the art of relevancy and argumentation. A person with a keen legal mind, sharply honed in an
approved law school, is supposed to be capable of tackling any problem. David Riesman has called this the "lawyer's gift of omnicompetence."' Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. relates how Jerome Frank staffed
his office during the early days of the New Deal when Frank was
General Counsel of the Department of Agriculture: "He searched
the law schools and the great firms of New York and Chicago to
make up his staff. Knowledge of farming was, from Frank's point
of view, the least of requirements; he had a lawyer's confidence that
men trained in the law can master anything. 'What we need,' he
[saidl ... 'are brilliant young men with keen legal minds and imag3
ination.'
The point can be briefly stated: the challenges that Dr. Wald
poses, the impact of science and technology upon society, are not
being met by legal education. Furthermore, even with the faint
signs of change seen in some law schools, it is not likely that legal
educators will substantially alter their ways. In net, then, my conclusion is this: lawyers are moving toward the same position as the
clergy - they are becoming irrelevant, technicians practicing "a
2 Riesman, Law and Sociology: Recruitment, Training and Colleagueship, 9 STAN.
L REv. 643, 645-46, 657 (1957).
3
A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE ComwG oF THE NEw DEAL. 50 (1959).
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rather esoteric craft of limited social value. '4 I do not suggest that
lawyers will vanish like the dinosaur; they will remain - but, like
most of the clergy who conduct those "Sunday morning social
hours," they have yet to achieve relevance in a scientific-technological age.
Biologist Barry Commoner of Washington University has put
the matter well for the theologians, in terms which hold significance
for lawyers:
We have become accustomed, in the past, especially in our organized systems of morality - religion - to exemplify the principles
of moral life in terms which relate to Egypt under the pharoahs or
Rome under the emperors. Since the establishment of Western
religions, their custodians have ... labored to achieve a relevance
to the changing states of society. In recent times the gap between
traditional moral principles and the realities of modern life has become so large as to precipitate... urgent demands for renewal for the development of statements of moral purpose which are
directly relevant to the modern world. But in the modern world
the substance of moral issues cannot be perceived in terms of the
casting of stones or the theft of a neighbor's ox. The moral issues
of the modern world are embedded in the complex substance of
science and technology. The exercise of morality now requires the
determination of right between the farmers whose pesticides poison the water and the fishermen whose livelihood may thereby be
destroyed. It calls for a judgment between the advantages of replacing a smoky urban power generator with a smoke-free nuclear
one which carries with it some hazard of catastrophic accident.
The ethical principles involved are no different from those inyoked in earlier times, but the moral issues cannot be discerned
unless the new substance in which they are expressed is under5

stood.

"The law," Chief Justice Earl Warren has said, "floats in a sea
of ethics." The problems Professor Commoner and Dr. Wald mention are moral or ethical in nature. But they are also legal. The
accommodations man makes in adapting the new science and the
new technology must perforce be structured in legal -terms. They
must be dealt with by lawyers at some point.
The question is how will lawyers handle them. We can no
longer accept the naive premise of Jerome Frank that people trained
in the law can master anything, if -the law in which they are trained
is defined in the same way as was done by Christopher Columbus
Langdell. Law is a conserving force, and lawyers are by nature
conservative in the true sense of that much abused term. In our
4

E. RosTow, REPORT Op THE DEAN OF THE YALE LAw SCHOOL 16

5B.COMMONER, SCIENcE AND SuRvivAL 130-31 (1966).

(1966).
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law and legal system, we live on the received wisdom of the past.
But the dear lesson is that the past is not adequate to cope with
modern problems. Adherence to the past is merely a necessity, said
Justice Holmes, not a duty; we cannot escape it, but we should not
be imprisoned by it.
Dean Don K. Price of the Harvard Graduate School of Public
Administration, in his classic The Scientific Estate,' has said that the
main lines of our public policy in the future will be determined
more by unforeseeable scientific and technological developments
than by legal and political doctrines presently known. I ask you to
ponder that for a moment and to forecast the place of lawyers in
such a society. One does not have to be a seer to make such a prediction, for evidence already exists that the lawyer is losing caste.
It takes no gift of clairvoyance but only a sustained observation of
the decisionmaking process in government, particularly as it relates
to science and technology, to see that the lawyer - even law itself
-is
not central to the process in any meaningful sense.
Nuclear scientist Dr. Ralph Lapp has said that "[nlo one - not
even the most brilliant scientist alive today - really knows where
science is taking us. We are aboard a train which is gathering
speed, racing down a track on which ,there are an unknown number
of switches leading to unknown destinations. No single scientist
is in the engine cab and there may be demons at the switch. Most
of society is in the caboose looking backward."' Lawyers, I suggest,
are in that caboose; they have been there in the past and are today
- even though the very nature of the problems now confronting
the human race calls for something different.
What is that "something"? At the very least what is called for
is "forward looking" - for a view of the ends and purposes, of the
goals of society, and of alternative means for achieving them. Few
lawyers are doing that today; few legal educators admit that this is
a prime need. But it is a vital necessity.
Lawyers tend to look upon problems in isolation, as discrete instances rather than a part of a flow of events, as something requiring an ad hoc resolution. The word a few years ago was "pragmatism" - to be a hardheaded pragmatist in Washington during the
early sixties was to achieve the pinnacle. But law is a process of
6D.

PRIcE, THE ScrNiFic EsTATE (1965).
7R. LAPP, TiE NEw PRIESTOOD: THE ScIENTIFIc ELITE AND THE UsE OF

PowER 29 (1965).
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decision, as Myres McDougal has said,' a process of decision open
ended in nature and ever in a state of "becoming." The problem
at its base involves the effective management of change, for change
is built into the social system - largely because of scientific and
technological innovation.
We cannot and should not rely upon the scientists, the technologists, the economists, the behavioral scientists - the technocrats of the modern era - to manage inevitable change with full
realization of the need to preserve humanistic values. Dean Price
maintains that "[the main philosophical threat to our freedom is
not that science will tempt us to invent a new materialist dialectic,
or establish a '1984' style dictatorship. It is rather that if we rely
on science alone we will be left with no sense of the purpose of existence, and thus no basis for determining our political goals to guide
the blind forces of applied technology."9 The challenge that is
posed - control over technology and attaining a sense of purpose
seems to raise questions similar to those for which lawyers have
traditionally been called upon by Americans to resolve.
The central position of the lawyer in this country, particularly
in government, has long been noted, although in recent years a
tendency to call upon others has become evident. Lawyers have
been generalists in policymaking positions, both in and out of government. Whether they can continue as such is one challenge Dr.
Wald presents to the legal profession, although he does not state it
expressly. Whether it will be met is doubtful. In a world characterized by rapid change, lawyerdom is not moving with the celerity
necessary even to keep up. Lawyers still fly backwards and seek to
answer the problems of today with the solutions of yesteryear, even
though the very existence of a problem means that the answers of
yesteryear are suspect or in need of reexamination.
Problems lie all about us: delay in the courts and crime in the
streets; polluted air and water; the threat of nuclear, chemical, and
biological war (has there ever been a weapon invented by man
which was not used?); a "beehive" world brought about by overpopulation which in turn is largely the product of scientific death
control measures, with little attention given to birth control; twothirds of the world goes to bed hungry, while some parts of the
world are overfed. This cannot last, simply because it is absurd.
8 McDougal,

Law as a Process of Decision: A Policy-Oriented Approach to Legal

Study, 1 NATURAL L.P. 53 (1956).
9 D. PRIcB, supra note 6, at 107.
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The old order is changing and lawyers seem fated to be spectators
rather than participants. I suggest that the American people will
not long tolerate any institution or any profession which does not
give them what they want or are entitled to. Not that they will
abolish it; they will merely ignore it. Just as the clergy has been
shunted aside to a few hours on Sunday morning, so too will the
lawyers be pushed aside unless they learn what Dr. Wald has called
"adaptation,the continuing flexibility to meet new conditions."
This is not being done at the present time. Lawyers, for example, have not adapted to the rise of public administration - the
bureaucracy - as the locus of power within government. They
still think in terms of the adversary system, a system of dispute settlement which is the product of the feudalistic, preindustrial, and
prescientific age. Their solution to the very real problems of administration is to make administrative agencies look more like
courts, when courts simply cannot cope with public needs. Small
wonder, then, that they are being shunted aside. Small wonder that
the lawyer as a lawyer has little to say about much and many of the
great public policy issues of the day. Lawyers do not even have an
accepted taxonomy. In this respect, they resemble the natural sciences of about 150 years ago - before Darwin and Mendel and the
great systemizers. Rather than being social engineers, they are legal
mechanics; they are the plumbers, those who merely patch up trouble spots.
The American people are not receiving what they should get
from the legal profession. Study any one of the great, pressing
problems of the day and one soon concludes that the lawyer's contribution is minimal at best. Population control, environmental
pollution, violence in the international community, the control of
heredity, human experimentation - all of these have scientific roots
and find the lawyers mute or at least speaking with muted tones.
Yet the question of population growth is as explosive as any in the
world, pollution can destroy the fitness of the planet for human
life, war can obliterate all life, and mankind can become the manipulated object of scientific experiments. The same may be said for
social problems. The question of the position of the Negro in
American society, surely the most abrasive of all social problems,
finds the lawyer with little to offer. In the international arena, tensions are building up between the rich nations and the poor, tensions that will in time, a very short time at that, explode. Once
again, lawyers have little to say.
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Even so, it is neither parochial pride nor guild loyalty which
leads me to suggest that law, properly conceived, properly studied,
and properly employed, can be of immense help in preserving those
values which are imbedded in the concept of human dignity. If
this is to be done, however, someone must make a start. The bar,
save for scattered individuals, does not seem to be able to transcend
its built-in limitations. The organized bar, particularly that pillar
of orthodoxy, the American Bar Association, does not seem adequate
to the need. Government lawyers are just that - government lawyers, having government for a client - and are essentially no different from private practitioners.
If law is to be restructured so as to meet the challenges of science and technology, then I believe the only place it can be done is
in the law schools. The start will have to come in the education of
lawyers. Here, the law schools should either get into the university
or get out of it, for as they are now, they exist merely as appendages
on the outside of the institution. The walls, high and impregnable,
which have been built between law and economics, law and politics, law and sociology, law and science must come down. Law,
furthermore, must be seen as part of a liberal education. No one
should graduate from college today without some knowledge about
law. I am not suggesting that undergraduates be taught rules of
law, but that they be given insight into the role that law and lawyers play in the social structure. The law schools should become
centers for policy analysis - critically and constructively examining
the pressing issues of the day, helping to articulate social goals, and
providing alternative means for achieving them.
Some way must therefore be developed to make the lawyer more
than a mere technician. Brandeis once said that a lawyer who knew
no economics was a menace to his client. And so he is. Today
that can be expanded: a lawyer who knows nothing about science
and technology serves no high social purpose. The advent of public
law as the dominant part of the legal system, a development largely
influenced by science and technology, has created an entirely new
social milieu in which the lawyer must operate.
The growth of government in size and importance, accompanied
by the rise of other social groups which wield power in a decentralized manner, such as the corporation, the trade union, and so on,
means that public law is becoming dominant in the legal order.
But the received wisdom under which lawyers and legal educators
operate is still largely private law oriented. A generation ago one

1967]

SCIENCE AND LEGAL EDUCATION

could not say that public law was dominant. But it is only 30
years since the Supreme Court found new light in old constitutional
clauses and, in effect, rewrote much of the Constitution. The added
responsibilities undertaken since then by government need no present restatement.
What is emphasized is that a challenge posed by the new system
a challenge which is traceable to science, technology, and the
rapid changes wrought by them - is that law must be seen both
normatively and instrumentally. In other words, law must be seen
as both an ordering system, a set of interdictory commands, which
was its historical character, and as the means by which public polides come into being and are administered - and thus as the official
manner by which basic values are translated into governmental and
other policies. This calls for a new type of thinking, for if law is
no longer viewed as a static system of logically consistent principles
and if attention must be paid -to social ends and purposes, then lawyers can no longer only fly backwards to see where they have been;
they must learn to fly forwards, to think purposively in terms of
aims, goals, and of alternative methods of achieving them. They
no longer can think of only the discrete case or dispute, 'but they
must think of an entire policy. As yet, the need has not been translated into legal education, however much it may be required in practice. Beyond doubt, it is a requirement for those lawyers who advise
governmental officials and it is likely true for those whose practice
takes them into contact with the public administration.
But legal educators, if one takes as evidence the books published
for law school use, have with few exceptions not yet caught up with
the need. They are still excessively court oriented and they still
issue books and articles that can only be based on a premise that the
public law explosion never took place. Most writing in legal periodicals, for that matter, falls into the same category, whether it deals
with a private or public law subject. Legal writers tend to make
their publications exercises in doctrinal exegesis of appellate court
texts, without reference to the context in which the problem arose
or the social and other factors that might be relevant. Both teaching and research tend to make the lawyer more parochial, more
introspective, more isolated.
Of perhaps more basic importance is the need, long noted by
some seminal thinkers, to think in terms of "process" and not of a
"static system." The set philosophy of an unchanging universe,
man-centered and earth-centered, is Ptolemaic or at most Newton-
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ian. Beyond Copernicus and Newton is the philosophy of process,
of change. The requirement that science presents to law is for seeing law as process, rather than a fixed body of rules, a requirement
which involves opening the mind to a greater variety of information. Speaking in 1913, Woodrow Wilson put apt expression to
the idea when he said, apropos the Constitution: "Living political
constitutions must be Darwinian in structure and practice. Society
is a living organism and must obey the laws of life, not of [Newtonian] mechanics; it must develop."1 The same may be said for
the specific questions of public policy imbedded in the Constitution.
One conclusion may be simply stated: the lawyer is becoming
deprofessionalized; he is becoming a limited technician, a legal mechanic. He may be necessary, just as auto mechanics are necessary,
but hardly on the order of the engineer who builds the auto. The
bar is deprofessionalized, both within and without government within government because the lawyer seems to be the mere handmaiden of the policymaker; without government because he is at
the call of the highest bidder for his services.
A second and perhaps more important conclusion is that the
lawyer, whether professional or mere technician, seems on the verge
of plummeting in social importance. 1 Unless and until he learns
to adapt himself to changing reality and to the demands and deepest aspirations of the American people, he will no longer occupy
that center of power and decisionmaking that so many foreign observers have noted as an outstanding characteristic of the United
States. There is little evidence that such adaptation is taking place.
While this certainly does not mean that lawyers will disappear or
become obsolete, it does mean that they may well become less relevant to the world at large, and thus obsolescent. They will still
exist, perhaps in large numbers, but merely as practitioners in the
mysteries of a craft of small social importance. Many years ago the
prescient Oliver Wendell Holmes could call the lawyer of the future, not the black letter man, but the expert in economics and statistics. To this may be added politics and science and technology.
LOW. WILSON, THE NEw FREEDOM (1913).
11 Both law and lawyers play a less important role in England than in the United
States.

See B. ABEL-SMITH & R. STEVENS, LAWYERS AND THE COURTS (1967).

The

reasons for the difference between England and the United States are multiple and complex. My suggestion is that a failure to adapt to the demands brought on by science and
technology will be a principal reason for lessening importance of the legal profession in
this country. Similarly, Abel-Smith and Stevens note that "power and influence in the
modern state had ebbed away from both lawyers and judges" because of a pervasive reluctance to become relevant to the needs of the modern era. Id. at 462.
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The Holmesian future is here, but the black letter men still dominate. In an age when public law is all pervasive, law schools still
are private law oriented; in the era of the administrative state, law
professors still think courts are central; in a Darwinian and Einsteinian age, they still adhere to Ptolemy and Newton; in a time when
Freud and successors have revolutionized the conception of the human mind, they still cling to the ideas of the 18th century. Law may
be conservative -

it is of necessity a conserving influence -

but

there is no requirement that it be blind. Lawyers must not only respond or react to scientific change; they must seek affirmatively to
guide that change into avenues which will maximize humanistic
values. How else will a society dominated by science and technology
retain those values? The manifest benefits that science and technology have brought to man cannot be minimized. The world has been
transformed in little more than a century. But the benefits should
not be allowed to override the fact that accompanying such advance
is a constantly shrinking margin for error or miscalculation. We
cannot continue to be so obsessed with scientific advance, as a matter of national policy, that little attention is paid to the problems of
protecting against the hazards of scientific and technological development.
Law and lawyers have to date been used to further scientific and
technological growth as an end in itself. Science and technology are
not irresistible forces of nature "to which we must meekly submit."1
Rather, they must be tamed; we must learn to apply the human
equation. The technocrat is not the new messiah - and it is high
time we in law recognize it. A sustained effort to devote as much
energy -to preserving humanistic values as in developing the exponential growth of science is long past due. The universities should
respond to this challenge, and the law schools, as integral parts of
the university community, should take the lead.
12 Address by Hyman G. Rickover, Philadelphia Bar Ass'n Law Day Address, May
1, 1964, 110 CONG. REc. 10, 143-45 (daily ed. May 11, 1964) and quoted in Green,
Nuclear Technology and the Fabric of Government, 33 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 121, 160

(1964).

